JON was renowned for being very persuasive at SANZAR meetings and getting more favourable outcomes for Australia than our contribution demanded.
He also managed to get the ARU to pay him a ridiculous salary and golden parachute that far exceeded what the sport in Australia could afford to pay him.
He also presided over reckless overspending by the ARU where they spent way more on players than their CBA obliged them to and frittered away the big financial reserves the ARU had from the 2001 Lions Tour and 2003 RWC without realising any long term structural benefit for rugby in Australia.
He is now always happy to criticise the current ARU leadership and somehow claim that everything done under his watch was great for rugby in Australia.
Good summary BH. May I add to it:
IMO, JO'N's (and his then ARU board btw) gravest failing with immensely negative strategic consequences was/is this:
His core proposition in establishing an expanded 'national footprint' for rugby (and that led in its assumptions to the establishment of the Force and the Rebels) and that such an expansion was essential for the future commercial and game strength of of the code here, was fatally flawed in one utterly critical dimension.
Namely, this type of high-risk expansion will only ever work if in parallel you design and deploy an equally ambitious and far-reaching strategy to ensure that the innate and enduring quality of sporting product provided throughout this 'national footprint' is enhanced and sustained at a higher level than that existing before the footprint was expanded.
If you cannot fund, conceive of and deliver that deep overlay of 'product' quality improvement essential to mitigate the multiple risks of serious size expansion, then don't expand at all, rather just build around what you have today.
This principle is a golden rule of any quality business and strategic practice. It was not followed by JO'N or the ARU and today we reap the deleterious consequences of a materially expanded national game delivering lower and lower standards of rugby across far too many frontiers and outlets.
Everything has accordingly suffered badly, from the Wallabies right down to the very base of the game, the local clubs and our base level of essential rugby skills. Today, purely for example, we have many Wallabies who cannot pass and kick from hand properly.
Those negative consequences are now glaringly obvious.
If we were to expand as dramatically as we did we needed a parallel strategy and process to ensure (a) that our players and playing quality matched and ideally exceeded our scale and (b) that we could enhance our long-term elite level playing quality to adequately compete against the world's best and thus protect our long-term code income potential vs the large costs and risks of code expansion.
To do this we had to undertake, inter alia, at the very least, the following 5 streams of what might be usefully called 'rugby product quality enhancement and growth':
- accelerated grass roots development, grassroots reach and quality ensuring and enhancing local rugby club solidity and its viable expansion potential in both player numbers and local player development quality and rugby community support programs
- (hugely important) a major, well-funded program to recruit for and develop in-depth rugby core skills enhancement programs and, related, pervasive coaching and coach-development quality from schools and grassroots programs up through all levels of the code
- a major program a la the AFL's Auskick aimed at dramatically improving (and even as needed cash subsidising) rugby's take-up and penetration of State schools so as to increase the national player base of the code and lessen the very risky, dangerously narrow reliance on the NSW and QLD GPS rugby schools factories
- a serious, sustained national program in core rugby skills areas designed to particularly aid the mid-level rugby player strata and above, such as: set-piece, kicking, ensemble attack modes, mental skills and preparation, injury avoidance and specialised S&C, etc.
- centralised governance and rigorous quality control over both the senior management ranks of each RU and ditto the senior coaching ranks of each RU, this to ensure the ongoing viability of each State RU in business leadership and playing capability terms
We gained a huge $ surplus from the RWC 2003, we expanded to the Force in 2006 and the Rebels in 2011. In 2017, that surplus is totally dissipated and we are consumed with economic and pervasive code quality issues on virtually every front.
Essentially, none, not even 1, of the 5 investment and long-term quality- and depth- assuring streams above ever occurred, not even close.
Now we stand at the precipice of a chronic failure of the code's survival potential in Australia.